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Estimating the Impact of Energy Price Reform on Saudi Arabian 
Intergenerational Welfare using the MEGIR-SA Model
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abstract
This paper investigates the intergenerational welfare impact of raising adminis-
tered retail energy prices in Saudi Arabia, an example of an oil-exporting country 
with a fast growing population. To achieve this, we develop a dynamic model 
with overlapping generations (called MEGIR-SA), which we believe is the first 
empirical application of its type to be developed for an oil-exporting country. The 
model is used to analyze the effects of the increase in some Saudi administered 
energy prices implemented at the end of December 2015. In particular, the model 
analyzes how these price increases might affect the welfare of Saudis through a 
direct increase in energy expenditures, an indirect rise in Saudi public income 
stemming from a lower domestic demand for oil that fosters oil exports at a given 
level of domestic oil production, and a direct increase of the turnover of the energy 
sector. The two latter effects can be redistributed by the Saudi public authorities 
to private agents through higher current public spending and/or public investment. 
The  analysis suggests that the increase in end-user energy prices results in a net 
overall favorable effect on the intertemporal welfare of all households. This mir-
rors the impact on the income of private agents of the surplus in public oil income 
associated with lower domestic consumption of oil products and recycled to pri-
vate agents. Moreover, it is shown that the additional oil income associated with 
the increase in domestic energy prices tends to be relatively more beneficial to 
future generations if it is recycled through public investment. This is reinforced 
if the future price of oil remains relatively low. In a possible future situation of 
declining oil prices and domestic production, a policy that would help meet the 
Saudi  Arabian objectives may consist of gradually increasing the fraction of the 
additional oil income that is recycled through public capital spending. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
At the end of December 2015, the Saudi Arabian government raised some of its admin-
istered retail energy prices. For example, the price of automotive diesel fuel increased from 0.25 
Saudi Arabian Riyal (SAR) per liter (l) to 0.45 SAR/l (resp. 0.07US$/l and 0.12US$/l) while the 
price of 95 gasoline increased from 0.60 SAR/l to 0.90 SAR/l (resp. 0.16US$/l and 0.24US$/l)—in-
creases of 80% and 50%, respectively (Platts, 2015). In addition, the price of natural gas increased 
from $0.75/MMBtu to $1.25/MMBtu (resp. 2.81 SAR/MMBtu and 4.69 SAR/MMBtu), an increase 
of 67% (Platts, 2015). In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the retail prices of energy (oil prod-
ucts, natural gas, and power) have traditionally been set by public authorities resulting in the retail 
prices being below the international market price (ECRA, 2015). This has allowed Saudis to ben-
efit directly from the relatively low domestic marginal cost of oil production. A drawback of these 
implicit subsidies was that it potentially encouraged an inefficient use of energy, thus reducing the 
amount of oil available for exports and revenue for the Saudi government. 
The rationale for raising retail energy prices at the end of 2015 is due to the need to im-
prove energy efficiency and the plummeting price of oil on world markets in 2015, given that oil 
income accounts for 88% of Saudi public revenue (SAMA, 2016) and thus impacts on Saudi public 
finances. The rapid drop in the price of crude oil resulted in a public deficit of around 15% of GDP 
in 2015 and triggered cuts of 12% in total public expenditures implemented in 2015 (SAMA, 2016). 
In this context, additional revenues can usefully contribute to improving Saudi public finances. For 
instance, higher retail energy prices increase the turnover of the public oil sector and also raise oil 
exports since higher retail prices lessen domestic oil consumption. 
Given these developments, this paper investigates the possible aggregate effects—posi-
tive and negative, current and intertemporal—of raising Saudi retail administered energy prices, 
as in December 2015, with respect to public finances, private income/activity, and generations. In 
particular, it assesses how these price increases might affect the welfare of Saudis through a direct 
increase in energy expenditures; an indirect rise in Saudi public income stemming from a lower 
domestic demand for oil that fosters oil exports at a given level of domestic oil production; and 
a direct increase in the turnover of the public energy sector. Moreover, given that these two latter 
effects can be redistributed by public authorities to the Saudi private agents through either higher 
current public spending or public investments, the different effects of the different redistributions 
are also considered. 
To achieve this, we develop an energy sector augmented, dynamic macroeconomic model 
with overlapping generations for the KSA (called MEGIR-SA, Model with Energy, Growth and 
Intergenerational Redistribution—Saudi Arabia). This, as far as we know, is the first model of this 
type developed specifically for Saudi Arabia (in fact we believe that this is the first model of this 
type developed for any Gulf region country).1 MEGIR-SA is therefore a bespoke model for the KSA 
that builds on and develops the overlapping generation (OLG) model of Gonand and Jouvet (2015) 
by specifically including the particular characteristics of the Saudi economy. MEGIR-SA compares 
the costs of the higher end-use energy price policy introduced in the KSA with the potential eco-
nomic gains that come from lower oil domestic consumption from higher energy prices, thus higher 
oil exports, energy sector turnover and public income recycled in the economy. One advantage of 
using a numerical general equilibrium model is that it allows for a realistic assessment of the size of 
1. It should be noted that there have been some previous attempts to generically model such oil-producing countries, 
(such as Balke et al., 2015), which are considered in the next section; however, MEGIR-SA is developed specifically for the 
KSA in order to analyze recent Saudi energy policy developments and proposals.
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the macroeconomic effects, not just their sign as in a theoretical model. Another advantage is that it 
allows us, in some cases, to measure the net macroeconomic effects when different implied mech-
anisms partially offset one another. Furthermore, MEGIR-SA computes the net effect on Saudi’s 
intertemporal welfare to capture the potential inter generation effect of the policy. Lastly, we focus 
on measures triggering directly and exclusively intergenerational redistributive effects. Recent price 
hikes in 2018 for energy products in KSA have been partially offset by systems of cash transfer 
for poorer citizens (called “citizens’ account”) for which clear data are not yet available and which 
trigger intra-redistributive effects. In this context, we consider different scenarios for the KSA. Note 
we produce simulations, not forecasts so that  the results do not suggest the most probable economic 
path for the KSA in the long run given current information; instead, the possible impact on growth 
and welfare in the KSA in the long run arising from the increased retail energy prices is analyzed. 
We consider polar simulations, with future reality probably being somewhere in-between. 
The paper is therefore structured as follows. Section 2 provides a survey of empirical GE-
OLG models with energy and KSA Macroeconomic modeling chronology followed by Section 3 
that presents the model. Section 4 provides the results. Section 5 concludes and outlines the key 
policy considerations. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Empirical GE-OLG models with energy
The study of the aggregate impacts of energy policy often involves the use of general equi-
librium (GE) models. Solow (1978) popularized the use of the GE framework for analyzing energy 
and environmental public policies and since then, energy-related GE models have been commonly 
used (e.g., Parry and Williams, 1999, Böhringer and Löschel, 2006, Knopf et al., 2010). However, 
most of these models do not account for intergenerational redistributive effects, despite Solow’s 
(1986) argument that it is essential to capture both intra and intergenerational effects of environ-
mental policies. He further points out that intergenerational issues ought to be analyzed within OLG 
models because such models simulate the behavior of different cohorts of different age, living in 
the same economy at the same time. Hence, the OLG model framework has been adopted for the 
analysis in this paper.
An important body of literature within an OLG framework has developed since John 
and Pecchenino (1994) and John et al. (1995); however, most of this has been within a theoretical 
framework involving only two generations. Therefore, the literature on numerical dynamic general 
equilibrium models using numerous overlapping generations in order to analyze the effects on in-
tergenerational equity of energy policies is scarce and relatively new; such as Carbone et al. (2012), 
Carbone et al. (2013), Rausch (2013), and Gonand and Jouvet (2015).  This paper therefore contrib-
utes to this literature by introducing MEGIR-SA (as detailed in Section 3 below).
2.2. Previous KSA Macroeconomic Modeling
There appears to be little previous research considering the macroeconomic modeling of 
the KSA, despite the Kingdom’s crucial role and importance in world energy markets. Table 1 
details, as far as we are aware, all the previous research using general equilibrium macroeconomic 
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Table 1: Survey of macroeconomic models for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Papers
Calibrated* or 
econometric models Energy content Summary of use
Ezzati (1976)** Combined dynamic in 
intertemporal, multi-
sectoral, empirical linear 
programing model and 
macroeconometric model
Oil price, production and demand Investigates the impact of oil 
price and production on 
macroeconomic indicators..
Looney and 
Fredericksen 
(1985)
Macroeconometric model with 
Optimal Control
Has an oil sector with oil revenues and 
the oil price
Investigates oil revenue impact 
on macroeconomic indicators.
Looney (1986) Macroeconometric model with 
Optimal Control
Oil price and production Investigates the impact of oil 
price on macroeconomic 
variables.
Looney (1988) Macroeconometric model with 
Optimal Control
Oil revenues Investigates impact of oil 
revenues on macroeconomic 
indicators.
Bjerkholt (1993) Combined Input-output model 
and applied GE model and 
macroeconometric model
Includes the production, demand, and 
prices of energy
Paper discusses modeling and 
data issues only. 
Cappelen and 
Magnussen 
(1996)
GE Model No standalone energy sector interacting 
with other sectors in the economy; 
however, includes electricity, gas, and 
water sector as well as an oil sector 
with refineries and the consumption of 
fuel and power.
Not used directly to analyze the 
energy sector 
Johansen and 
Magnussen 
(1996)
Macroeconometric model Behavioral equation and identity for 
electricity, gas, and water sector. Oil 
sector broken down into crude oil and 
natural gas from the supply side with 
consumption of fuel and power on the 
demand side.
Not used directly to analyze the 
energy sector. 
De Santis (2003) GE model Includes crude oil price, demand, and 
supply.
Investigates the impact of crude 
oil price, demand, and supply 
shocks on prices, output, 
profits, and welfare. 
Alam (2007) Two-sector GE model No discussion of the energy sector. Not used to analyze energy issues
Nakov and Nuno 
(2013)
GE model Oil demand, supply and price Investigates the impact of oil 
indicators on macroeconomic 
environment and investigates 
oil taxes and subsidies.
OEGEM (2017) Macroeconometric model Model includes relationships between 
energy products and other sectors of 
the KSA economy and has the ability 
to investigate the impact of the world 
economy and the KSA’s economy on 
the KSA’s energy sector.
Commercial model available for 
subscribers to use for own 
analysis.
KGEMM (2017) Macroeconometric model Model includes an energy sector with 14 
modeled secondary energy products 
for the industrial, commercial, 
transportation, and residential 
sectors—that interacts with other 
sectors of the macro economy.
Used by KAPSARC for in house 
analysis and policy advice. 
Blazquez et al. 
(2017)
DSGE model Model includes energy and energy services 
sectors
Investigates the macroeconomic 
impact of the KSA deploying 
more renewables, coupled with 
reductions in implicit energy 
subsidies.
Notes: * Calibrated models include CGE, DSGE, Hybrid, etc.  ** Ezzati (1976) uses a combined model for OPEC members that 
includes the KSA.
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models for the KSA.2 This shows that that there is a mixture of calibrated models and econometric 
models, most of which have an energy component to some degree or a full energy module. Despite 
this, Blazquez et al. (2017) appears to be the only study that utilized a macro model to investigate 
explicitly the possible impact of implicit energy subsidy cuts in the KSA. Blazquez et al. (2017) 
suggest that if integration costs of renewable technology were high in the KSA, then households’ 
welfare would be maximized at around 30–40% renewables penetration. Furthermore, a policy fa-
voring renewable energy would increase the dependence of the KSA on oil, given that a larger share 
of GDP would be linked to oil exports and so, potentially, to oil price shocks.
Plante (2014) and Balke et al. (2015) also considered the impact of fuel subsidies, but not 
explicitly for the KSA. Instead, Plante (2014) and Balke et al. (2015) developed a generic open 
economy calibrated model for net oil importing and exporting countries; thus, the KSA is included 
only within groups of similar oil-exporting countries. Plante (2014) suggests that fuel subsidies 
distort the macroeconomic environment and increase aggregate welfare costs. Balke et al. (2015) 
finds that the removal of subsidies would be welfare improving for the oil-exporting countries, but 
the optimal subsidy from the point of view of oil exporters is not necessarily zero. However, as indi-
cated these are generic conclusions, not specifically for the KSA. Therefore, although Plante (2014), 
Balke et al. (2015) and Blazquez et al. (2017) considered the impacts of fuel subsidies on welfare, 
they did not consider the intergenerational welfare effects of the reductions in energy subsidies, 
which are considered in detail in this analysis.3
In summary, although some macro models have been developed for the KSA there has been 
little published work using such models to analyze the impact of the recent increased administrative 
prices of energy. Moreover, none, as far as we are aware, has addressed intergenerational wealth 
effects of the changes. These are the points that we address in our research here as detailed below.
3. THE MODEL
This section outlines the construction of MEGIR-SA. The main features of the OLG setting 
are first presented followed by a discussion of the details of the Saudi economic characteristics that 
the modeling of MEGIR-SA takes into account. Annex 1 in the Online Appendix contains further 
detailed information. 
3.1. The overlapping generations framework
This framework allows for detailed modeling of the interactions between the consumption/
savings and work/leisure arbitrages.4 The main output of the OLG framework for Saudi private 
2. Given the focus of the research here, Table 1 includes only general equilibrium models for the KSA and omits Vector 
Autoregression and Vector Error Correction models (for example, see Cashin et al., 2014 and Alshehry and Belloumi, 2015). 
Similarly, other holistic type models (such as Olatunji et al.’s, 2013 KSA artificial neural networks model) are excluded.
3. Note, Matar et al. (2015; 2017) also consider the impact of reducing the implicit energy subsidies in the KSA using a 
Mix Complementary Bottom-Up Optimization Model, but given the analysis is not based on a macroeconomic model they 
are excluded from Table 1. Generally, Matar et al. (2015; 2017) find that higher energy prices in the KSA would significantly 
reduce the consumption of oil and natural gas; however, like Blazquez et al. (2017), they do not consider intergenerational 
welfare effects.
4. In OLG models, contrary to models incorporating an ILA (infinitely lived agent) where Ricardian equivalence holds, 
saving behavior is only partially influenced by anticipated future tax liabilities. The OLG framework leads to a consideration 
of the implications of generational overlap on energy policy in terms of distributional effects across different generations with 
a finite elasticity of capital supply, and without a full Ricardian equivalence effect (see Jouvet et al., 2000).
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agents is an intertemporal vector of private supply of capital per efficient unit of labor. MEGIR-SA 
builds upon the Gonand and Jouvet (2015) OLG setting by designing MEGIR-SA to ensure that it is 
consistent with the specific characteristics of the KSA economy in particular, with regards to:
•  a major oil exporter (according to SAMA (2016), 87% of public income in 2014 flowed 
from the oil exports);
•  with a rapidly growing population (according to General Authority for Statistics, 2016a 
the KSA’s population has grown by about 2.5 % a year since the beginning of this de-
cade);
•  a relatively high proportion of expatriates who work but do not invest their saving in the 
KSA;
• electricity produced almost exclusively from fossil fuels;
•  administered retail energy prices below international market prices with no non-price 
rationing of domestic demand; and
•  the need for public infrastructures to still be developed.
Saudi private agents are modeled by a standard, separable, time-additive, constant rela-
tive risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, and an intertemporal budget constraint. Each cohort is 
represented by a representative individual who does not take account of the utility of subsequent 
generations. In the model, private agents are assumed to have perfect foresight. The utility function 
has two arguments (consumption and leisure): 
( )
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where ,+t j jc  is the consumption level of the average individual of a cohort of age j in year t+j, 
[ ], 0;1+ ∈ t j j  is his/her optimal fraction of time devoted to work. σ  is the relative risk aversion co-
efficient and is equal to the inverse of the intertemporal substitution coefficient. ,0Ψ t  stands for the 
average life expectancy at birth of a cohort born (a=0) in year t. ρ  is the subjective rate of time pref-
erence. 1/ ξ  is the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure. χ  is the preference for 
leisure relative to consumption. jH  is a parameter whose value depends on the age of an individual 
and whose annual growth rate is equal to the annual gains of labor-augmenting technical change 
(with H₀=1) (see Annex 1). The intertemporal budget constraint is: 
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where ,+t j jy  stands for the total income net of taxes of the average individual representative of a co-
hort, such that ( ), , , , , , ,1ε τ τ= − − + − +Φt a t a t a t NA t P t NA t energy t ay w d d . In the latter expression,  tw  stands 
for the gross wage per efficient unit of labor, which stems from the maximization of the production 
function. The parameter εa links the age of a cohort to its productivity. The variable ,t NAd  is used as 
a monetary proxy for public goods and services in kind brought in a lump sum fashion to Saudi 
private agents, irrespective of age and income. In the baseline, no-reform Scenario A (see Section 
3.3. below), it is defined as , , , ,/ N  = Θ ∑t NA current t t a Saudis
a
d  where ,Θcurrent t is the aggregate current public 
expenditure (in billion real SAR, see public finances section), and , ,N  t a Saudis the number of Saudi 
individuals in the cohort aged a at year t. 
Estimating the Impact of Energy Price Reform on Saudi Arabian Intergenerational Welfare / 61
Open Access Article
All the sources of public income that are not directly related with oil exports or energy 
prices are modeled by one aggregate tax on private agents that is proportional to their income ( ,τ t NA) 
because this public revenue is assumed to be on average proportional to growth in the long run at 
unchanged policies.
The variable dt,energy stands for the energy expenditures paid by one Saudi individual (see 
Annex 1). The variables ,τ t P and ,Φt a relate to an implicit pension regime in the KSA. Given the 
current Saudi demographics characterized by a relatively very young population, their empirical 
values in the model for the next few decades remain small but tend to increase over time in line with 
demographic ageing. Parameter ,τ t P represents a proportional tax rate financing the PAYG pension 
regime. In this expression, ,Φt a stands for the pension income received by the retirees of a cohort. 
As explained in section 3.2.3., higher public infrastructures bolster the households’ utility 
insofar as they raise the levels of tr  and of tw , the marginal productivities of savings and (resp.) labor. 
Having computed the optimal path of consumption and leisure for all the cohorts of the 
model over their whole life-cycle, we derive the average saving of each cohort ( , , ,= −t a t a t as y c ) and 
its accumulated wealth ( ( ), 1, 1 ,1 − −Ω = + Ω +t a t t a t ar s ). The annual saving is assumed to be invested in 
the capital market, yielding the interest rate tr. The interest payments are capitalized into individual 
wealth. 
The total capital supplied by Saudi households is computed as ( ), , ,N= Ω∑t t a t a Saudis
a
W . It 
corresponds to the total capital supplied by private agents to the domestic economy. Given the expe-
rience over many years, expatriates are assumed to send all their savings abroad. Total efficient labor 
supply is aggregated in the same way, using the optimal labor supplies of the average individuals 
( , t a’s), although without distinguishing between Saudis or expatriates, since both work in the KSA. 
By dividing the stock of capital supplied by nationals to their domestic economy Wt , by the optimal 
labor supply, the intertemporal vector of private Saudi supply of capital per efficient unit of labor 
can be arrived at. The total income of Saudi private agents corresponds to a modeled GNP.  Annex 1 
contains further information on this OLG framework. 
3.2. Saudi economic specificities encapsulated in the MEGIR-SA model
3.2.1. Demographics
The main outputs of the module for demographics are, for every year, the population by 
age, the Saudi employed population by age, and the employed population of expatriates by age. 
MEGIR-SA encapsulates between 50 and 60 cohorts, depending on the year and the average life 
expectancy. The model is built using annual data and thus captures the detailed dynamics of the 
population structure. Each cohort is characterized by its age at year t, has ,Nt a members and is rep-
resented by one average individual. The average individual’s economic life begins at 20 years (a=0) 
and ends with certain death at ,0Ψ t  ( ,0a 20= Ψ −t ), where ,0Ψ t  stands for the average life expectancy 
at birth of a cohort born in year t.
The population of the KSA consists of nationals and expatriates, with 56.5% of the ac-
tive population in the KSA in 2016 being non-Saudi (General Authority for Statistics, 2016b). The 
model assumes that Saudis provide the domestic economy with savings as well as labor, whereas 
expatriates provide only labor to the domestic economy with savings sent to foreign countries as 
remittances. Accordingly, this distinction allows the model to take account of, and compute, the 
macroeconomic effects of Saudization—a preference for Saudis when hiring for a job - and notably 
its upward influence on the capital per unit of labor. 
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The specification of the demographic module breaks up each cohort into working and 
non-working individuals, Saudis, or expatriates. In each Saudi sub cohort, a proportion ,νt a of in-
dividuals is working and earn wages. Labor participation rates in the model are an average of the 
different rates for men and women. The Saudi inactive population is divided into two components. 
A first component corresponds to individuals who never work nor receive any pension during their 
lifetime. The second component, i.e., πt,a which is the proportion of pensioners in a cohort, is com-
puted as a residual.
3.2.2. The energy module
3.2.2.1. The oil production sector
The main output of the module for the oil production sector is an intertemporal vector of 
public revenues from oil exports ( oil,tY ) expressed in billions of 2005 Saudi Riyals. For future pe-
riods, ,  Υoil t is computed as 
, ,
, , 1
, 1 , 1
EXP barrel
EXP barrel− − −
Υ = Υ oil t oil toil t oil t
oil t oil t
 where ,EXPoil t represents the national 
exports of crude oil (in MMbbl) in year t, and ,barreloil t is the price of a barrel of Arabian Light on 
world markets in year t. The dynamics of the exports of refined oil products are not considered and 
we assume that there will be no Saudi exports of natural gas in the future. We also assume that the 
nominal exchange rate between the US dollar and the Saudi Riyal will remain constant (as has been 
the case since 1987).
Depending on the parameterization of the model, the future price of a barrel of Arabian 
Light on world markets ( ,barrel oil t) can be simulated as being influenced (or not) by the level of 
Saudi exports of oil. Moreover, there are several theoretical models and examples over recent de-
cades that suggest a change in Saudi Arabi’s oil exports has an impact on the international oil price 
(cf. Bhattacharyya, 2011). Therefore, in the short to medium run, there are good reasons to assume 
that the KSA is not a price taker on the world market of oil (although, some recent literature suggests 
that this market power may have somewhat faded away in the late 2000s, for example Huppman 
and Holz, 2012). However, in this research we analyze the very long run, the time horizon being 
somewhat longer than one considering relatively short-run phenomena related to spare capacity, for 
instance. Furthermore, the analysis by Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Hicks (2013) suggest that an oil 
supply shock does not necessarily trigger a sizeable and long lasting influence on the international 
price of oil. Therefore, given that MEGIR-SA is a long-run model (due to the OLG framework) and 
that we are interested in analyzing the very long-run, we assume for the main model simulations pre-
sented here that the international oil price does not react to the variations of Saudi oil exports. How-
ever, in order to check the robustness of this assumption we also undertook an indicative economet-
ric exercise to estimate the elasticity of the international oil price with respect to Saudi oil exports. 
This suggested that in the long-run it would be about –0.5 (although, this is the “long-run’ in a time 
series context based on about 30 observations thus not necessarily consistent with the very long-run 
analysis of this research). We then re-ran the model simulations using this estimated elasticity as a 
robustness check. We found only a very small change in the quantitative results and no change in the 
qualitative results. The full details of the econometric estimation and the model simulation results 
are given in Annex 2 in the Online Appendix. 
By definition, EXPoil,t = Poil,KSA,t – CONSoil,t where Poil,KSA,t is the national annual production of 
crude oil at year t (in MMbbl) and the variable CONSoil,t is the endogenous national consumption of oil 
(in MMbbl). Since the model is parameterized on KSA data, Poil,KSA,t is assumed to be set exogenously 
by public authorities (in MMbbl). CONSoil,t is such that , , ,  , ,  ,CONS D D D= + +oil t oil t elec crude oil t elec refined oil t 
where Doil,t is the national demand for oil, crude or refined, in the non-power sector (in MMbbl); 
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Delec,crude oil,t the demand for crude oil in the power sector (in MMbbl), and Delec,refined oil,t the demand 
for refined oil products in the power sector (in MMbbl). The three latter variables are endogenous 
and depend on the level of activity, the macroeconomic characteristics of the general equilibrium in 
the model, demographics, administered domestic prices, and public policies (discussed in the next 
section).
3.2.2.2. The end-use prices of energy and domestic demands for different energies
The main outputs of the module for the energy sector are an intertemporal vector of aver-
age weighted real price of energy for end-users energy,tq  , along with the dynamics of the energy mix 
between different sources of energy (domestic demand for oil oil,tD , domestic demand for natural gas 
natgas,tD , and domestic demand for electricity elec,tD ). 
The average weighted real end-use price of energy  is computed as an average of exog-
enous, regulated end-use prices of natural gas, oil products and electricity, weighted by the propor-
tions  such as 
3
, , , 1 , 1
1
q q *D / D− −
=
 
=  
 
∑ ∑energy t i t i t i t
i i
 where ,qenergy t stands for the average real weighted 
end-use price of energy at year t (in real 2005 SAR/MWh), , 1D −i t  for the final consumption in volume 
for natural gas (i=1), oil products (i=2)( , Doil t= 2,D t) and electricity (i=3),(all in ktoe), and where ,qi t is 
the weighted price, at year t, of natural gas (i=1), oil products (i=2) and electricity (i=3)(all in real 
2005 SAR/MWh).
The real end-use prices of natural gas and oil products ( ,qi t, i∈{1;2}) in turn are computed 
as weighted averages of regulated end-use prices of different sub categories of energy products: 
∀i∈{1;2}, , , , , ,
1
q a q
=
= ∑
n
i t i j t i j t
j
. . , ,qi j t.  stands for the real end-use price of the product j of energy i at year
t. For natural gas (i=1), we assume that the end-use price of natural gas for households (j=1) and for 
industry (j=2) are equal, on average. For oil products (i=2), three sub-categories j are modeled: the 
end-use price of automotive diesel fuel (j=1), the end-use price of light fuel oil (j=2) and the end-use 
price of premium unleaded 95 (j=3) (all expressed in real SAR/l). This structure for energy products 
covers the major part of the energy demand for fossil fuels. For electricity (i=3), two sub-categories 
j are modeled: the end-use price of electricity for households (j=1), and the end-use price of elec-
tricity for industry (j=2).
All retail energy prices are set directly by the Saudi government. Thus, shifts in demand for 
energy in the KSA do not necessarily result in changes in the domestic prices of energy, as observed 
in the KSA during the last few decades. This policy aimed to maintain price stability, secure the 
needs and welfare of consumers, and preserve important social interests in the country. As a conse-
quence, energy users benefit from “low’ prices administered by government agencies as compared 
to international prices. These administered prices do not require direct government expenditures to 
keep domestic prices below international prices. Although they are low compared to international 
prices, retail energy prices in Saudi Arabia cover domestic production costs, and were set to values 
very close to the marginal cost of production on average up to 2015. The regulated, real end-use 
price of electricity 3,q  t also covers the costs of production of power in the KSA (see, for instance, 
ECRA, 2014), which is consistent with the long-run characteristics of the model.
The volumes of energy demands from 1985 onwards are broken down into demand 
for oil products ( ,Doil t = 2,D t), demand for natural gas ( , 1,D D=natgas t t}) and demand for electricity 
( , 3,D D=elec t t) (in ktoe). Data come from the IEA database. In this model, they are used mainly to 
compute the average weighted real energy price for end-users ,qenergy t from 1984 onwards. 
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The computation of the overall energy mix in the future (i.e., , 1,D D=natgas t t, ,Doil t = 2,D t, 
, 3,D D=elec t t) is endogenous based on a framework commonly used in the literature (e.g., Leimbach 
et al., 2010) which derives the future energy mix using a nest of interrelated, constant elasticity of 
substation (CES) functions. This nest allows for the level in the future of each component of the 
energy mix—i.e., ,Doil t, ,Dnatgas t and ,Delec t—to vary over time according to changes in the relative 
regulated end-use prices of their associated energy vectors, i.e., 1,tq , 2,tq  and 3,tq . The more the 
relative price of one source of energy increases, the more its relative demand declines. The mix of 
technologies used to produce power is directly influenced by the decisions of public authorities and 
the mix of fuels used to produce electricity in the KSA is driven by policy that may not necessarily 
mirror economic optima. Given that no official KSA long-run forecasts for the technology mix in 
the power sector exist, we assume, consistent with regular statements from Saudi authorities, that 
any additional demand for electricity in the future will not be covered by power plants using oil.
This setting allows to derive the total domestic consumption of oil CONSoil,t = Doil,t +
,  , ,  ,D D+elec crude oil t elec refined oil t. Annex 1 contains further information.
3.2.3. The production function
The main outputs of the module with the production function are an intertemporal vector of 
marginal productivity of capital ( tr ), of wage per unit of efficient labor ( tw ), of total energy demand 
( tE ), and of demand for capital per unit of efficient labor.
The production function is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) nested one, with two 
levels: one linking the stock of productive capital and labor, the other relating the composite of the 
two latter with energy. We follow Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) for the method of including the 
stock of public capital in the production function. We checked that our results were robust to other 
ways of inserting the stock of public capital in the function. The production function refers here to 
the non-oil sector of Saudi Arabia. The K-L module of the nested production function is:
( ) ( )[ ]
1
1 111 11
 ,  , 1
ς β ββεα α
− −− 
= + − ∆ 
 
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The parameter α  is a weighting parameter; β  is the elasticity of substitution between 
physical capital and labor; tL  is the total labor force; and tA  stands for an index of total factor 
productivity gains which are assumed to be labor augmenting, i.e., Harrod neutral. The parameter 
( )max ,
, ,N  
L
ε ε
ν
= ∑
a t
t a t a
at
a t  
links the aggregate productivity of the labor force at year t to the average age of 
active individuals at this year. t ,aN  is the total number of individuals aged a at year t. ∆t corresponds 
to the average optimal working time in t (defined by households to maximize their lifetime utility) 
Thus ∆t tL  corresponds to the total number of hours worked, and ε ∆t tt tA L  is the labor supply ex-
pressed as the sum of efficient hours worked in t, or, as an equivalent, the total flow of efficient labor 
in a year t—i.e., the total labor supply brought by Saudis and expatriates.
The stock of physical capital available to the non-oil sector comprises a demand for capital 
by private agents  ,  KSA priv tK  and a public stock of capital  ,KSA pub tK  that stands for the infrastructure 
that benefits the private sector. Profit maximization of the production function in its intensive form, 
i.e., with  , , ε
=
∆
KSA priv t
KSA priv t
t t t t
K
k
A L
, yields optimal factor prices, namely, the cost of physical capital: 
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These equilibrium relationships show the influence of the stock of public infrastructures 
 ,KSA pub tk  on the income of private agents (through tr  and tw ). Once parameterized on empirical data, 
they suggest that a higher level of  ,KSA pub tk  also triggers, all else being equal, a higher level of tr  and 
tw—whereas a higher level of  ,KSA priv tk  fosters tw  but lessens tr  (see Rioja, 2001). More infrastructure 
enhances the income of both factors of production, and thus bolsters activity.
Introducing energy demand tE .  in a CES function, as Solow (1974), yields another produc-
tion function  tY  in volume: 
( ) ( )[ ]
1
1 γγ γα α = + − 
enen en
t t t tY B E C
where a is a weighting parameter, γ en is related to the elasticity of substitution between factors of pro-
duction ( tC ) and energy (with γ =en 1 – 1/elasticity), tE  is the total demand for energy, and tB  stands 
for an index of (increasing) energy efficiency. The cost function is the solution of 
,
min +
t
t t
t t t C tE C
q B E p C  
under the constraint ( ) ( )[ ]1 γγγ α= + − enenent t t tY a B E C .
In the latter objective function, tq  refers to the price of energy services, these services being 
measured by t tB E . The price of energy services tq  is related to the price of energy computed in the 
energy module ,  energy tq  by the relationship: ,=t t energy tq B q . Given that the stock of capital, the labor 
supply, the cost of capital, the wage per unit of efficient labor, the deflator 
tC
p  and the real price 
of energy ,  energy tq  are all known and that tB  is exogenous, it is possible to derive the total energy de-
mand: ( )
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1/ 1γ γ γ γ
− −
− − − −
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 
en en en
en
tt t t C
E q a C p a . It can be checked that when tC  increases, the demand 
(in volume) for energy tE  rises. When the price of energy services ,=t t energy tq B q  increases, the de-
mand for energy tE  diminishes. When energy efficiency tB  accelerates, the demand for energy tE  
is lower. In this framework, the production function also takes account of the fact that developing 
public infrastructures  ,KSA pub tK  is an energy intensive policy with an upward effect on the domestic 
demand for energy (since ∂ tE /∂  ,KSA pub tK >0). 
3.2.4. Saudi public finances
The public budget constraint is , , , ,Υ +Υ = Θ +Θoil t others t current t capital t. For future periods, ,  Υoil t 
is computed as , ,, , 1
, 1 , 1
EXP barrel
EXP barrel− − −
Υ = Υ oil t oil toil t oil t
oil t oil t
 as explained in Section 3.2.2.1. above. By defini-
tion, , , , ,EXP P CONS= −oil t oil KSA t oil t where , ,P  oil KSA t is the national annual production of crude oil (in 
MMbbl). ,CONSoil t is the endogenous national consumption of oil (in MMbbl)(crude or refined 
products), such as , , ,  , ,  ,CONS D D D= + +oil t oil t elec crude oil t elec refined oil t. It depends notably on the retail 
price of oil products ( )2,tq  through ,Doil t. Annex 1 provides the formula for ,Doil t.5
5. The assumption that any future additional demand for electricity will not be covered by power plants burning oil (see 
end of Section 3.2.3.2.) implies that ,  ,Delec crude oil t and ,  ,Delec refined oil t are constant in the future. 
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The other public revenues ( ,Υothers t)(in real terms) refer in the model to all the sources of 
public income that are not directly related to oil exports. In the Saudi context, these may include 
notably corporate tax, zakat (Muslim alms-giving), customs import duties and user fees. Insofar as 
these other public revenues are on average proportional to growth in the long run at unchanged pol-
icies, our model simulates them as evolving over time along with the long-term Solow-type growth 
rate (i.e., the growth rate of the efficient labor force), augmented by possible additional income flow-
ing from higher retail price changes decided by public authorities. Annex 1 provides the formula. At 
unchanged energy prices, all these public revenues are on average proportional to economic activity 
in the long run, our model simulates them as financed by an aggregate tax on private agents that is 
proportional to their income.
Public revenue is used to finance public current expenditures ( ,Θcurrent t) or public capital 
expenditures ( ,Θcapital t). Current public spending ,Θcurrent t is redistributed in a lump sum fashion in 
the model, as a proxy for public services. Each Saudi private agent receives public transfers, with 
a variable ,dt NA standing for public expenditures that one individual benefits from irrespective of its 
age and income. It is a monetary proxy for goods and services in kind bought by the public sector 
and consumed by households.
Public capital expenditure ,Θcapital t feeds into a gross stock of public capital  ,KSA pub tK , repre-
sentative of public infrastructures. Public revenue can also finance an effort of fiscal consolidation 
implemented from 2015 onwards. 
Saudi government in the future is assumed to face a fiscal consolidation constraint. All 
scenarios incorporate a fiscal consolidation from 2016 onwards during which the respective levels 
of current public spending ( ,Θcurrent t) and of public investments ( ,Θcapital t) are adjusted downwardly in 
order to get the Saudi public deficit back to 0. These adjustments are proportional to the respective 
weights of ,Θcurrent t and ,Θcapital t in total public expenditures. Fiscal consolidation is assumed to benefit 
foreign investors/lenders only (and not Saudi agents). The duration of the consolidation period in the 
model is 10 years. Sensitivity analysis carried out with a length of five years shows that our results 
are robust to this assumption (see Section 4, Result 4).
New, higher public capital investments trigger two macroeconomic mechanisms in the 
model: they enhance the marginal productivity of labor and private capital over decades as shown 
in the production function, and they redistribute directly some income to Saudi agents (see Annex 1 
for more precisions on this latter item). Accordingly, the amount of income benefiting Saudi when 
public infrastructures are built depends notably on a) the proportion of Saudis among the total em-
ployed population, and b) the amount of intermediate consumption that is produced domestically. 
The former stems from the demographic module and is exogenous in the model. The latter mirrors 
the level of diversification of the Saudi economy: the more the KSA provides the intermediate 
consumption needed to build its own infrastructure, the more Saudi agents benefit from public 
investments. Annex 1 provides additional details and explains why we consider that the cash effect 
for private agents of public investments is around 70% of the amount of the public capital spending 
each year. Sensitivity analysis will be carried out as concerns this parameter in Section 4.
3.3. Policy scenarios
In the model, the increases in administered retail energy prices influence the income and 
welfare of private Saudi agents through different channels:
•  a direct increase in energy expenditures ( ),t energy td E  weighing on the private net income; 
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•  an indirect rise in Saudi public income ( )( ), ,EΥoil t t energy tq  stemming from a lower domes-
tic demand for oil which fosters oil exports at a given level of domestic oil production; 
•  a direct increase of the turnover of the public energy sector, which increases 
( ), ,Υothers t energy tq .
The two latter effects can be redistributed by public authorities to the Saudi private agents 
either through higher current public spending ( ,Θcurrent t) or public investments ( ,Θcapital t). 
We define { }, , , , , , , , 0= Υ + Υ −Υ −Υ >t oil t ref others t ref oil t noref others t norefPublinc  as the increase in 
the future total public income associated with energy price hikes in a reform scenario as compared 
to a no-reform scenario. We then define the parameter y as the fraction of tPublinc  that is recycled 
through higher public capital spending. It is exogenously set by public authorities. In this context, 
we consider two policies, each with two different future paths for the Saudi oil sector:
•  The future paths for the Saudi oil sector depend on the value of the price of a barrel of 
oil (Arabian light) on world markets in the future ( ,barreloil t) and the future level of Saudi 
production of oil. We distinguish two polar simulations (see Figure 1):
○  Future oil income increasing and future oil production stable (Scenarios B, i.e., sce-
nario B0 and scenario B100, see Table 2): the simulated value of ,barreloil t follows a 
temporal trend over time which is increasing by 4% per annum. Depending on the pa-
rameterization of the model, this trended value can in turn be influenced by Saudi oil 
exports, with an elasticity of –0.5 (see Annex 2 for further details and a presentation 
Figure 1: Simulations of the future oil price and Saudi oil production in scenarios
Table 2: Reform scenarios in the model
y
0% 100%
Future oil prices increasing + future oil production stable B0 B100 
Future oil prices and oil production declining C0 C100 
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of the associated results).6 Additionally, the Saudi production of oil decided by public 
authorities is assumed to remain stable in the future and close to its current, histori-
cally high levels (i.e., 10.6MMbb/d).
○  Future oil income and oil production declining (Scenarios C, i.e., scenario C0 and 
scenario C100, see Table 2): the temporal trend is declining by 4% per annum up to 
2050 before stabilizing. Depending on the parameterization of the model, this trended 
value can in turn be influenced by Saudi oil exports (see Annex 2). The Saudi level 
of oil production is also assumed to diminish by 4% per annum up to 2050, before 
stabilizing. This refers to a pessimistic—although not unrealistic—scenario in which 
the world demand for Saudi oil diminishes (up to 2.5MMbb/d in 2050) and the price 
converges gradually to the Saudi marginal cost of production in 2050 (i.e., around 
10US$). In this case, we assume that the anticipations of Saudi households changed 
during the 2010s, with the associated impact on their optimal economic behavior. 
•  The policies considered are distinguished according to the level of recycling of addi-
tional public income through higher public capital spending in the future (i.e., the value 
of y).7 We distinguish two polar simulations: either 0% or 100%.8 Hence, Scenario 0B  
refers to a rise in retail energy prices in end 2015 in a context of high and stable future 
Saudi production of oil and of increasing future oil prices that is anticipated by private 
agents, and where the additional public income is recycled through public current send-
ing ( 0%=y ). Scenario 100B  is the same as 0B  except that the additional public income 
is recycled through higher public capital expenditures (y = 100%). The same applies to 
scenario C0 and scenario C100 (see Table 2). 
The baseline Scenario A refers to a situation where no increase in retail energy prices is 
decided in December 2015, future Saudi production of oil is stable, future oil prices increase by 
4% per annum, and all Saudi cohorts anticipate these paths and define their intertemporal optimal 
behaviors accordingly.9 
In dynamic GE models where, by construction, all variables interact at all years, assessing 
the influence of one variable or policy (e.g., the rise of retail energy prices and its implication for 
fiscal policy) on any other variable (e.g., households’ welfare) requires a comparison of two scenar-
ios where the only difference is the level of the variable or policy. Accordingly, results for Scenario 
B0 (resp. B100) present the difference between the level of intertemporal welfare of different cohorts 
of households in Scenario B0 (resp. B100) and the same level as in baseline Scenario A. The same 
holds for Scenarios C0 and C100 as compared to the baseline Scenario A with the same assumption 
concerning the future decline in the prices and production of oil. Our strategy thus allows us to ana-
6. Formally, the price of the barrel of oil in the simulations of the model is defined as barreloil,t = 
( ) ,, 1 /
, 1
EXP
barrel 1 1
EXP
ε−
−
  
 + −       
oil t
oil t barrel barrel oilexp
oil t
trend  where /εbarrel oilexp is the long-run elasticity of the price of a barrel of 
Saudi exports.
7. Reform scenarios all assume that the increase in the future total public income associated with rising energy prices (
tPublinc ) is entirely recycled in the Saudi economy through higher public spending.
8. In the baseline scenarios with no energy price increase in 2016, the proportions of current and capi-
tal expenditures as a fraction of total public spending remain constant once the consolidation period is over:
, , 1
, , , 1 , 1
, 2026−
− −
Θ Θ
= ∀ ≥
Υ + Υ Υ + Υ
current t current t
oil t others t oil t others t
t . In scenarios with an increase on the price of retail energy prices, the future
paths of ,Θcurrent t and ,Θcapital t depend notably on the value of y .
9. This path is for instance close to what is forecasted by Oxford Economics in 2015 up to 2040. Cf. OEGEM (2017), 
“Oxford Economics Global Economic Model’, 2015.
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lyze the impact of a permanent increase in administered retail energy prices, assuming that all other 
exogenous elements remain constant (notably, the future prices and quantities of oil).
The increase in regulated retail energy prices from 2016 onwards is an informational sur-
prise for the forward-looking private agents, who redefine accordingly their optimal behaviors (con-
sumption and labor supply) over their remaining life cycle. This assumption about anticipations fits 
well with the announcements of the Saudi government. Higher end-user energy prices lessen the 
future net income of individuals, thus influence their consumption and savings, the stock of capital, 
growth, and total energy demand. 
Incidentally, once the model has converged to its intertemporal general equilibrium, the 
average weighted retail price (qenergy,t) increases by close to 50% and triggers in the long run a 
downward impact on the total energy demand (Et) in general equilibrium between 13% and 18%, 
depending on the way the additional oil income is recycled in the economy.10 
Reform scenarios all assume that the increase in the future total public income associated 
with rising energy prices ( tPublinc ) is entirely recycled in the Saudi economy through higher public 
spending. Sensitivity analysis in Section 4 investigates the sensitivity of our results to this specific 
assumption. 
Sensitivity analysis to the main exogenous parameters is carried out and commented in 
Section 4 below (see Table 3). Annex 1 provides additional details about the parameterization of 
the model. 
4. RESULTS
Result 1: In Saudi Arabia, the analysis suggests that the permanent increase in the KSA’s 
end-user energy prices implemented in December 2015 will trigger a net overall favorable effect on 
the intertemporal welfare of all households. This mirrors the impact on the income of private agents 
of the surplus in public oil income associated with lower domestic consumption of oil products and 
recycled to private agents. 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the impact of higher energy prices on the intertemporal welfare of 
each cohort in Scenarios B0, B100, C0 and C100, respectively. It appears that even for declining future 
oil prices and domestic production of oil (as in C0 and C100), lower domestic consumption of energy 
implied by higher retail prices fosters oil exports, raises oil income and, in case of immediate recy-
cling to private agents, increases overall their income and welfare. This result flows from the fact 
that, even after the price hike, Saudi private agents keep paying a price for oil products that is below 
the price that would be implied by prices of fossil fuels on world markets. Note, administered energy 
prices in Saudi Arabia do cover the costs of production and although there is no explicit subsidy 
10. By definition, Scenarios C (C0 and C100) incorporate a decline in the future levels of oil prices and Saudi oil produc-
tion that is non anticipated by Saudi households before the 2010’s. They simulate a possible very different future state of the 
Saudi economy with much lower oil income, growth, and welfare. Accordingly, comparing scenarios C0 and C100 with sce-
nario A would not allow for assessing the sole influence of the rise in retail energy prices and its implication for fiscal policy 
on the cohorts’ intertemporal welfare, but mostly the influence of much lower oil income on Saudis’ welfare. Thus, assessing 
the sole influence of the rise in retail energy prices and its implication for fiscal policy on the cohorts’ intertemporal welfare 
requires the comparison of scenarios C0 and C100 with scenario Alow oil which is the same as scenario A with no rise in retail 
energy prices unless that it incorporates a previously non-anticipated decline in the future oil price and level of production 
from 2016 onwards. Accordingly, results for scenario C0 (resp. C100) present the difference between the level of intertemporal 
welfare of different cohorts of households in scenario C0 (resp. C100) and the same level in scenario Alow oil. They measure the 
impact, in our dynamic general equilibrium, of increasing retail energy prices in a context of lower future prices and produc-
tion of oil, which is precisely what this paper aims at. 
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there is an implicit cost for the public finances. Moreover, the 2015 prices were set at a level much 
lower than the price of oil on international markets. Accordingly, raising energy prices in 2015 only 
resulted in higher prices (and no lower transfer to the energy sector, because these transfers were 
already inexistent before the increase in administered energy prices). In this context, Result 1 stands 
out since the impact of raising retail energy prices remains positive on the households’ welfare, be-
cause of higher oil exports—a situation that would not have been observed in a non-oil producing 
country.
Result 2: The analysis suggests that the additional oil income associated with the increase 
in energy domestic prices tends to be relatively more beneficial to future generations if it is recycled 
through public investments ( y = 100% as in B100 and C100 ) and relatively more to currently living 
cohorts if it is recycled through current spending. 
Public capital expenditures involve less transfer of income to private agents in the short 
run than higher current public spending. However, they foster the marginal productivity of labor and 
capital in the long run in the aggregate production function. Figures 2 and 3 show that, for given 
Figure 2:  Impact on the intertemporal welfare of Saudi cohorts of higher retail energy prices 
(with higher future oil prices and immediate recycling of the additional oil income)
Figure 3:  Impact on the intertemporal welfare of Saudi cohorts of higher retail energy 
prices (with lower future oil prices and production, and immediate recycling of the 
additional oil income)
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additional oil income stemming from lower domestic consumption, recycling with higher public in-
vestment would trigger higher economic activity in the long run. Depending on the future price and 
production of oil, the relative situation of the cohorts between the scenarios changes. In scenarios 
B (with higher future oil prices on world markets), only generations born from 2015 onwards are 
better off in scenario B100 than in scenario B0 as far as their intertemporal welfare is concerned. This 
result stands out insofar as the current generations have no incentive to raise public investments 
since the welfare effect will most predominantly benefit future generations—but not them.
For less favorable prospects concerning oil prices and domestic oil production, all gen-
erations born after 2005 are better off in scenario C100 than in scenario C0. This points to Result 3. 
Result 3: The lower the future price of oil and Saudi oil income (as in C0 and C100  ), the 
more the future cohorts benefit relatively from a recycling of the additional oil income through pub-
lic investments.
This result relates to how Saudi private agents adapt when they anticipate that future oil 
income in the KSA may be less favorable than they expected up to a few years ago. Revised down-
ward expectations increase the private saving rate in order to smooth the impact of lower oil income 
on the future consumption profile. Private capital accumulation accelerates. Since higher public 
investment bolsters the productivity of private capital and labor, if the prospects for the KSA’s oil 
income deteriorate, public investments will increasingly bolster welfare in relative terms. 
Result 4: Sensitivity analysis: these results can be influenced—but not dramatically 
changed—by other assumptions about the parameterization of the model, or assumptions about the 
use of the additional oil income during the fiscal consolidation period or the short term cash impact 
of higher public investments. 
Table 3:  Robustness checks of the results depending on the values of some exogenous 
parameters
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Table 3 provides some robustness checks of the results depending on the values for a set 
of exogenous parameters in the model. This shows that the dynamics of the model are reasonably 
robust to different, while still relatively realistic, values for the psychological discount rate, the elas-
ticity of substitution between capital and labor, the elasticity of substitution between capital/labor 
and energy, and the parameter of the preference for leisure relative to consumption. Assuming also 
a shorter period for the fiscal consolidation implemented from the mid-2010s onwards (five years 
instead of 10 years as assumed here) would also not substantially modify the results. 
The dynamics of the model are, as anticipated, impacted more by different values for pa-
rameters directly linked with the dynamics of the accumulation of physical capital, i.e., the elasticity 
of capital-labor.
Reform scenarios all assume that the increase in the future total public income associated 
with rising energy prices (Publinct) is entirely recycled in the Saudi economy through higher public 
spending. We investigated the sensitivity of our results to this assumption, running scenarios where 
Publinct is used to finance (and thus accelerate) the fiscal consolidation, with no redistribution to 
Saudi agents during that period. Accordingly, it implies no upward effect on public spending (cur-
rent or capital) during the next years). Figure 4 provides the results of sensitivity scenarios where the 
additional oil income is fully used to accelerate the reduction of the public deficit during the fiscal 
consolidation period (so up to the 2020s only). Illustrative results are presented for scenarios C0 and 
C100 (scenarios B100 and B0 would give similar outcomes). Whether the additional oil income asso-
ciated with the increase in energy domestic prices is used (or not) to finance a fiscal consolidation 
in the short-run, triggers significant reduced effects on the intertemporal welfare of current genera-
tions. However, the change for future generations is mechanically lower and tends to disappear for 
future cohorts born in the 2020s. 
Figure 5 shows the impact of a lower assumption for the short term cash injection associ-
ated with public investments (i.e., instead of our standard assumption of 70%, we use 50% here, an 
order of magnitude that would be reached if only one third of intermediate consumption goods used 
in public investments were produced domestically). Illustrative results are presented for scenario 
C100 (scenario B100 would give similar outcomes). Not surprisingly in this context, the positive im-
pact of recycling through higher public investments is lower for each current and future generation. 
Figure 4:  Sensitivity analysis (with additional oil income fully used to accelerate the reduction 
of the public deficit during the fiscal consolidation period up to the 2020s)
Estimating the Impact of Energy Price Reform on Saudi Arabian Intergenerational Welfare / 73
Open Access Article
However, in the long run, future generations remain better off with recycling through higher public 
investments, as in result 2. 
So far, the results suggest that the choice by public authorities of the value of y, the fraction 
of the additional public oil income recycled through capital expenditures, imply different outcomes 
as concerns the welfare of current cohorts and future generations, and also as regards short-term and 
long-run growth. In this context, a possible choice consists in changing the value of y over time in 
order to benefit as much as possible from the short-run impact of increasing current public spending 
and the long-run effect of higher public investments. Accordingly, we define *y  as an intertemporal 
vector of ty ’s changing every five years such as: 
[ ]
( ) [ ], , 0% , , 100% , , 0%;100%
1950;2030
min max ;= =
 
− 
  
∑ tt intertemp i y intertemp i y intertemp i yy i
W W W 

where , , 0%=intertemp i yW  stands for the intertemporal welfare of the cohort born at year i and in a scenario 
with 0%=y . With such a framework, the values of ty  minimize the sum of the absolute values of the 
differences, for each cohort, between its intertemporal welfare in the most favorable case between 
the two polar recycling scenarios ( 0%=y  and 100%=y ) and its intertemporal welfare with the 
variable ty . The intertemporal vector of ty  is obtained through numerical convergence. 
Result 5: In case of declining future oil prices and domestic production of oil, a desirable 
policy may consist of increasing gradually the fraction of the additional oil income stemming from 
lower domestic demand up to 100% in the future. In case of future higher oil prices and high Saudi 
production of oil, a desirable policy may consist in recycling the additional oil income stemming 
from lower domestic demand mainly through current public spending. 
In scenario B, where by assumption future oil prices on world markets keep increasing and 
Saudi oil production remains high, the value of ty  as defined above is 0% over the next three de-
cades. Hence, in the admittedly relatively favorable exogenous context of scenario B, recycling the 
additional oil income increases public current expenditures because its effects on the welfare of cur-
rent and of (most of) future cohorts would be higher on average than with higher capital spending.
Figure 5:  Sensitivity analysis (with lower short term cash injection associated with public 
investments)
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Figure 6 displays the values of ty  in scenario C, a case with lower oil prices on world 
markets and Saudi production. It suggests that recycling the additional oil income would favor pro-
gressively more public capital spending. 
Overall, Result 5 suggests that the fraction of the additional oil income that could be re-
cycled through higher public investment, depends very much on the expected world oil price and 
the level of Saudi oil production in the future. It also qualifies, more precisely, the implications 
of Results 1 to 3. Whatever the future context for oil prices on world markets and Saudi domestic 
production, the analysis here suggests that there is a rather strong case for recycling through higher 
current spending, a significant amount of additional oil income stemming from higher energy retail 
prices and the associated lower domestic energy demand—at least in the coming years. Increased 
public investment could balance pessimistic expectations of future oil prices and Saudi domestic 
production. However, Result 5 suggests that there may not be high urgency for doing so, unless pub-
lic authorities decide to favor the welfare of future generations at a significant cost for current ones. 
5. CONCLUSION
This paper investigates the intergenerational welfare impact of raising retail energy prices 
in Saudi Arabia—a major oil-exporting country. Like other oil-exporting countries, Saudi Arabia 
has started to increase the administered end-user prices for energy. Based on an OLG model specif-
ically developed for the KSA, we show that the sizeable price increases implemented at the end of 
December 2015 may in fact increase the welfare and therefore benefit all current and living Saudi 
cohorts due to the favorable impact of oil exports for a given level of domestic production of oil. 
The question arises, however, as to how to recycle this additional oil income in the economy, ei-
ther through public investment or through public current spending. Our analysis suggests that this 
choice may trigger important intergenerational redistributive effects. It is all the more relevant for 
the KSA’s policymakers to consider this intergenerational dimension of energy policy choices as 
Figure 6:  Optimized percentage of recycling the additional oil income through public capital 
spending (assuming declining future oil prices and domestic production—Scenario C)
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81% of the current Saudi population is under 40 (General Authority for Statistics, 2016a). Another 
policy implication of the results is that, in this context, the anticipations about future oil prices sig-
nificantly influence the impact of current recycling policies. More precisely, our modeling suggests 
that focusing exclusively on higher public investments is not an ideal policy to adopt. Progressively 
raising public capital expenditures may well function as a desirable mechanism, however, if the fu-
ture oil income in the KSA happens to diminish over time, whether because of lower prices on world 
markets and/or lower domestic production mirroring lower world demand. 
While our results are in line with the partial equilibrium analysis of welfare effects of price 
reforms (Davis, 2017), our paper confirms that the result holds in general equilibrium. More impor-
tantly, our paper provides additional insights into intergenerational redistributive effects of higher 
retail energy prices that are especially useful for oil-exporting countries with young and fast-grow-
ing populations. More generally, the analysis critically informs important current debates with high 
policy relevance. In many oil-exporting countries, retail energy prices on the domestic market are 
below what prices on international markets would imply—and this is an important element of a so-
cial contract in these countries. This paper argues that higher retail prices of energy—especially in 
the KSA—can nevertheless increase welfare for households, through lower domestic consumption 
and thus higher oil exports that can be redistributed in the economy. 
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